Abstract-In this paper, we introduce a novel roadside unit (RSU)-aided message authentication scheme named RAISE, which makes RSUs responsible for verifying the authenticity of messages sent from vehicles and for notifying the results back to vehicles. In addition, RAISE adopts the k-anonymity property for preserving user privacy, where a message cannot be associated with a common vehicle. In the case of the absence of an RSU, we further propose a supplementary scheme, where vehicles would cooperatively work to probabilistically verify only a small percentage of these message signatures based on their own computing capacity. Extensive simulations are conducted to validate the proposed scheme. It is demonstrated that RAISE yields a much better performance than previously reported counterparts in terms of message loss ratio (LR) and delay.
I. INTRODUCTION
A VEHICULAR ad hoc network (VANET) is a promising network scenario for facilitating road safety, traffic management, and infotainment dissemination for drivers and passengers. By being equipped with communication devices, vehicles can communicate with each other as well as with the roadside units (RSUs) located at critical points of the road, such as intersections or construction sites. In VANETs, onboard units (OBUs) frequently broadcast routine traffic-related messages [1] with information about position, current time, direction, speed, acceleration/deceleration, traffic events, etc. By frequently broadcasting and receiving traffic-related messages, drivers can get a better awareness of their driving environment. They can take early action to respond to an abnormal situation to avoid any possible damage or to follow a better route by circumventing a traffic bottleneck. In addition, with a VANET connected with the backbone Internet, passengers sitting in vehicles can go online to enjoy various entertainment-related Internet services with their laptops. These services include downloading/uploading data information from the Internet, local information acquisition (e.g., road maps and hotel information), and electronic advertisements [2] .
Before putting the above attractive applications into practice in VANETs, we must resolve security and privacy issues. Particularly, we must guarantee message authenticity and integrity. Moreover, we have to protect user-related privacy information, such as the driver's name, license plate, model, and traveling route. Although previous studies have addressed the aforementioned issues, they have not taken the scalability and communication overhead into consideration. The main idea of the previous security schemes for VANETs is to sign each message before sending it and verify each message when receiving it. According to the Dedicated Short-Range Communication (DSRC) protocol [3] , a vehicle sends each message within a time interval of 100-300 ms. Generating a signature every 100 ms is not an issue for any current signature technique. However, in a high-density traffic scenario, e.g., if 50-200 vehicles are within the communication range, the receiver needs to verify around 500-2000 messages/s, which will lead to a high computation burden to the receivers. Furthermore, traditional public key infrastructure (PKI)-based security schemes require the public key of the sender and the corresponding certificate to be included in the messages. The security overhead is usually bigger than the useful message contents. This issue has to be well addressed due to the limited wireless channel bandwidth available in VANETs. Conventional PKI-based schemes also do not consider the issue.
To address the above issues and provide a significant improvement in authentication efficiency and scalability for the intervehicle communications (IVC) of VANETs, in this paper, we propose an RSU-aided message authentication scheme named RAISE. Compared with previous messageauthentication schemes [4] - [10] , RAISE explores an important feature of VANETs by employing RSUs to assist vehicles in authenticating messages. The main idea of RAISE is illustrated as follows. A metropolitan area could likely be covered under a communication range of RSUs in the near future. When vehicles enter an area covered by an RSU, vehicles first perform mutual authentication and key agreement with the RSU. Vehicles that received safety messages do not need to verify the message through a conventional PKI-based scheme. Instead, each safety message will be attached to a short message authentication code (MAC) generated by the sender under the secret key shared between the sender and an RSU. The RSU helps to verify MACs and disseminate the results of the authenticity of the safety messages for vehicles in its 0018-9545/$25.00 © 2008 IEEE communication range. The verification of the message can be performed in an extremely fast manner due to the nature of the MAC authentication, which is just a fast symmetric decryption operation. RAISE improves the authentication efficiency and reduces the communication overhead in the mean time. Nevertheless, in a case where the presence of RSUs is not pervasive at the beginning of the VANET deployment stage, we propose a supplementary scheme, i.e., cooperative messageauthentication scheme (named COMET), which works in the absence of RSUs. With COMET, vehicles do not need to verify all the message signatures that they receive from their neighboring vehicles; instead, they cooperatively work and verify a small percentage of these message signatures with some probability based on their own computing capacity. As such, the authentication efficiency can be improved, and a low message loss ratio (LR) can also be guaranteed in COMET.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II surveys the related work. Section III briefly introduces our system model and the preliminaries, including problem statements and design objectives. Section IV presents the proposed RAISE scheme in detail and explains how RAISE can ensure security and privacy without incurring high overhead and scalability concerns. The proposed COMET scheme is described in Section V. Section VI analyzes the performance of the proposed schemes through extensive simulations. Section VII analyzes the security of the proposed schemes. We draw conclusions and outline future work in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
Many related studies have been reported on the security and privacy-preservation issues for VANETs [4] - [11] . To achieve both message authentication and anonymity, Raya and Hubaux [4] proposed that each vehicle should be preloaded with a large number of anonymous public and private key pairs together with the corresponding public key certificates. Traffic messages are signed with a public-key-based scheme. To achieve privacy, each public and private key pair has a short life time, and a pseudo ID is used in each public key certificate. However, this scheme requires a large storage capacity to store this security information. Recently, Lin et al. [5] introduced a groupsignature-based scheme to sign each message. Since there is no identity information included in messages, this approach can also achieve identity privacy preservation. Furthermore, the group-signature-based scheme reduces the storage cost of the public and private key pairs and reduces the bandwidth consumption used to transmit the certificate revocation list (CRL) over the Internet. To reduce the overhead of the groupsignature-based scheme, Calandriello et al. [6] developed a similar scheme in which a vehicle can generate public and private key pairs by itself by using a group key. This scheme can achieve a tradeoff between the group-signature-based scheme and the traditional PKI-based scheme. Xi et al. [7] introduced a random key-set-based authentication protocol to preserve the vehicles' privacy. Lu et al. [8] proposed a conditional privacypreservation scheme. The scheme divides privacy into three levels. First, an RSU is responsible for issuing temporarily anonymous certificate to vehicles, and thus, the RSU can know which vehicle uses the anonymous certificate it issued. Second, however, for IVC, a vehicle's identity is absolutely anonymous to other vehicles. Third, the proposed scheme can make a trust authority (TA) know a vehicle's real identity. The TA has the highest priority, which can trace a vehicle in the case where a malicious attack and resource abuse has occured. In addition, since the expiration date in the certificate indicates the validity period of the certificate, this scheme inherently addresses certificate revocation issues as well. Although these schemes have well-addressed privacy issues in VANETs, however, they all do not take scalability issues into consideration.
To cope with the aforementioned scalability issues, Lin et al. [9] developed a time-efficient and secure vehicular communications (TSVC) scheme, which employs the TESLA [12] approach to address the scalability issue. With TSVC, a vehicle first broadcasts a commitment of hash chain to its neighbors and then uses the elements of the hash chain to generate a MAC with which other neighbors can authenticate this vehicle's following messages. Because of the fast speed of MAC verification, TSVC can reduce the message LR. However, TSVC is not robust when the dynamics of traffic becomes large because a vehicle should broadcast its key chain commitment much more frequently. Under this situation, the LR of TSVC could increase. Zhang et al. [10] proposed an identity-based batch verification (IBV) scheme for vehicular sensor networks. IBV not only achieves conditional privacy but also reduces the overall verification delay of a batch of message signatures. IBV is a PKI-based signature scheme, and it uses a pairing-based cryptographic [13] , [14] approach. It is clear that the computation speed of a paring is slower than that of a multiplication operation. Thus, when verifying a single signature, IBV is slower than other common PKI-based signature schemes. However, when verifying a batch of message signatures, the verification speed of IBV is much faster than that of other PKI-based schemes. Nevertheless, IBV is still a PKI-based scheme, and thus, it is still difficult to solve the scalability issue, particularly for IVC.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES

A. System Model
A vehicular communication network hierarchically consists of two layers. The upper layer is composed of application servers (ASs) and RSUs, as shown in Fig. 1 . The ASs can be connected with RSUs through secure channels, such as the transport layer security (TLS) protocol, with either wired or wireless connections. The ASs provide application data for RSUs, and RSUs work as gateways to deliver data to the lower layer, which is composed of vehicles. All vehicles and RSUs keep time synchronization. Vehicles can communicate with each other and with RSUs. In this paper, we aim at addressing the security issues in the lower layer.
In general, RSUs have a higher computation capability than vehicles and are trusted since it is not easy for RSUs to be compromised. According to DSRC, the communication range of an RSU is adjustable, and thus, it can be larger than that of the vehicles, such that some vehicles can hear from the RSU while the RSU may not hear from the vehicles. The locations where the density of vehicles is high will be allocated with an RSU, such as an intersection and any possible traffic bottleneck. Notice that only the IVC message authentication is considered when any RSU is available. For those areas with sparse vehicle distribution, the scalability issue will not be a problem, and a conventional PKI-based authentication scheme can work sufficiently well.
B. Problem Statement
The current IEEE Trial-Use standard [15] for VANET security provides detailed documentation, including the choice of cryptosystems. To authenticate a message's sender and guarantee the message's integrity, OBUs or RSUs should sign messages with their private keys before the messages are sent. Fig. 2 shows the format of a signed message [15] , where a 125-B certificate and a 56-B Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) signature have to be attached for each 69-B IVC message. Obviously, the cryptographic overhead (the certificate and the signature) takes up a significant portion of the total packet size.
Cryptographic operations also lead to high computation cost for receivers to verify these messages. According to DSRC [3] , a vehicle sends each message within a time interval of 100-300 ms. Generating a signature every 100 ms is not an issue for current public-key-based signature schemes. However, in the case where 50-200 vehicles are within the communication range, the receiver needs to verify around 500-2000 messages/s. Public key certificates have to be verified as well. Signing and verifying each message can certainly achieve secure communication; however, these cryptographic operations make the security scheme not scalable to the traffic density. Therefore, the verification algorithms are required to be very fast such that the incoming messages can be processed. Unfortunately, all currently available signature schemes for VANETs based on PKI-based or group-signature-based schemes are not suitable for this stringent time requirement.
C. Design Objectives
In this paper, we aim at achieving the following security objectives.
1) Message integrity and source authentication: All accepted messages should be delivered unaltered, and the origin of the messages should be authenticated to guard against impersonation attack.
2) Low communication overhead and fast verification:
The security scheme should be efficient in terms of small communication overhead and acceptable processing latency. A large number of message signatures should be verified in a short interval. 3) Conditional privacy preservation: The identities of vehicles should be hidden from a normal message receiver during the authentication process to protect the senders' private information, such as the driver's identity and any personal information. On the other hand, the authorities should be able to trace the sender of a message by revealing its identity in case of any exceptional case, such as liability investigation.
4) Prevention of internal attack:
Different from the study in [16] , a normal vehicle holding its own keying material cannot obtain the other vehicles' keying materials. Furthermore, even if a vehicle is compromised, an adversary cannot use the compromised vehicle to obtain the other vehicles' important information.
IV. RSU-AIDED MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION SCHEME
In this section, we propose an RSU-aided messageauthentication scheme named RAISE. With RAISE, when an RSU is detected nearby, the vehicle tries to associate with the RSU, and the RSU assigns a unique shared symmetric secret key and a pseudo ID that could be shared with other vehicles. With the symmetric key, the vehicle generates a symmetric MAC code and then broadcasts each message by signing the message with the symmetric MAC code instead of a PKIbased message signature. Upon receiving the messages signed with the MAC code, the receiving vehicles cannot immediately verify the message because the MAC code is not known to the receiving vehicle. Instead, the RSU knows the key of generating the MAC code; thus, the RSU can be responsible for verifying the message and then notifying the authenticity of the message to other receiving vehicles.
The detailed implementation of RAISE will be presented in the following sections. For clarity of presentation, the notations throughout this section are listed in Table I .
A. Symmetric Key Establishment
Once a vehicle V i detects the existence of an RSU R (e.g., through a Hello message from the R), V i initiates anonymous mutual authentication and establishes a shared secret key with R. This can be achieved by adopting the Diffie-Hellman keyestablishment protocol secured with the signature scheme [17] . The mutual authentication and key-establishment processes are shown as follows:
where g a and g b are random elements of the Diffie-Hellman key-establishment protocol and a, b ∈ Z * q , and the shared session key between R and V i is K i ← g ab . When receiving the first message from V i , R decrypts {g a C V i } P K R ( as a concatenation operation is described in Table I ) with its private key SK R and then verifies V i 's public key P K V i in the anonymous certificate
, where ID R is the identity of R, and R verifies the signature. If the above three steps are correctly completed, the mutual authentication succeeds. Note that the mutual authentication in the protocol is probably secure (see [17] for more details). The pseudo identity ID i that R sends to the vehicle V i in the second flow is uniquely linked with K i . 1 With ID i , R can know which vehicle sends the message and can further verify the authenticity of the message with their shared symmetric key. Therefore, R maintains an ID-Key table in its local database, as shown in Fig. 3(a) . Vehicles update their anonymous certificates once they get out of the radio range of an RSU. For instance, vehicles choose a new public/private key pair [4] to sign messages. In Fig. 3(a) , T i denotes the time when R receives the latest message from V i . T i is used to determine the freshness of a record. If the interval between the current time of R and T i exceeds a predefined threshold, the record corresponding to T i will be removed from the ID-Key table and stored in the trace evidence table, as shown in Fig. 3(b) , which will be used for the purpose of traceability. The LT i in Fig. 3(b) is used to control how long trace evidence is kept. In reality, it is decided by the authority and is much larger than the T i in Fig. 3(a) . The details of the trace process will be discussed in the following section.
B. Hash Aggregation
Once the vehicle V i establishes the symmetric key
, where ID i is V i 's pseudo identity assigned by R, M i is the message to be sent, and T S i is a timestamp that records the current time when sending the message M i . T S i is used to thwart the replay attack. Then,
Because K i is only known by R in addition to V i itself, only R can verify M i . Thus, to give the other vehicles the ability to verify the authenticity of M i and, at the same time, reduce the communication overhead, the RSU R is responsible for aggregating multiple authenticated messages in a single packet and send it out. The detailed process is given as follows.
1) R checks if the time interval between the current time and the time when R sent the last message-authenticity notification packet is less than a predefined threshold Δt.
If so, go to Step 2. Otherwise, go to Step 4. 2) When R receives a message 
, and then, go to
Step 1. Otherwise, drop the packet.
4) R aggregates all the hashes generated at Step 3, i.e.,
, and signs it with its private key SK R . Then, R one-hop broadcasts HAggt {HAggt} SK R to vehicles within its communication range.
The predefined threshold Δt in the above algorithm can affect the message authentication delay (MAD), which will be further discussed in Section VI-B. In addition, the above algorithm supports the identity traceability property. Since there is a one-to-one mapping between the key K i and the certificate C V i in the trace evidence table, the RSU can distinguish the unique sender of a message. Thus, in the case where a malicious vehicle sends a bogus message (e.g., the context of the message is found to be fake after a while), the RSU can trace back to the message sender by finding out its certificate. The RSU could also report the certificate to a trusted authority for further investigation.
C. Verification
When a vehicle receives messages sent by other vehicles, it only buffers the received messages in its local database without immediately verifying them. The buffered record has the following format:
is computed by the receiver). Once vehicles obtain the signed packet HAggt {HAggt} SK R from the RSU, they are able to verify the buffered messages one by one. First of all, vehicles use the RSU's public key P K R to verify the signature {HAggt} SK R . If it is valid, vehicles will check the validity of the previously received messages buffered in the record in the local database. This is done by comparing whether there is a match between the buffered record with the deaggregated message. For example, 
is because the RSU may have not aggregated the message M i yet when V i receives the first HAggt packet from the RSU. In addition, a vehicle has to be capable of verifying all incoming messages sent by neighboring vehicles, which means all messages received by the vehicle can be received by its corresponding RSU as well. However, if the communication between the RSU and a vehicle [or RSU to vehicle communications (RVC)] has the same distance limit as that of IVC, a vehicle will lose the messages sent by the vehicles that have not been in the eligible distance with the RSU. Fig. 4 shows the illustration. Let the distance limit of RVC be r. The RSU can communicate with vehicles V 1 and V 2 . Since V 3 is not associated with the RSU, V 2 cannot verify messages from V 3 , although the two vehicles are supposed to be communicable. To overcome this problem, we require the distance limit for RVC to be two times longer than that for IVC. The distance between vehicles and vehicles, and between vehicles and RSUs, can be derived from GPS coordinates, because the GPS coordinates can be contained in the messages of vehicles.
D. Enhancement of User Privacy
With RAISE, if a vehicle does not change its pseudo ID all the time during the association period, an adversary can trace the vehicle movement trajectory according to the vehicle's unchanged ID. Therefore, the vehicle's trace privacy is violated during the small time duration.
To preserve the trace privacy, we employ the concept of k-anonymity (k entities are not distinguishable) [19] in the proposed RAISE scheme to mix k vehicles. With RAISE, RSUs assign a common pseudo ID to k vehicles, where the k vehicles (as a group) will take the same pseudo ID when communicating with the RSU. When an adversary intends to trace a specific vehicle through the pseudo ID, he/she will easily get lost after the group of vehicles passes through an intersection (where an RSU is allocated). In other words, the route of a specific vehicle cannot be identified. The biggest value of k would be the total number of vehicles within the coverage range of an RSU, in which all the vehicles' messages are mixed and cannot be distinguished. Notice that such a scenario is equivalent to the case in which vehicles have no identity at all.
In the k-anonymity RAISE, RSUs can still identify a vehicle by finding the symmetric key shared with the vehicle, and each pseudo ID corresponds to k unique symmetric keys. Suppose a vehicle
to RSU R. R first finds out k possible keys corresponding to the pseudo identity ID. Then, R subsequently checks whether
that is generated by one of the k symmetric keys. If there is a match, the message is considered valid. Since a vehicle holds a distinct key shared with the RSU, the key that makes the above comparison can be used to find the message sender's anonymous certificate that was used during the first mutual authentication process. This can be done by looking up the RSU's local ID-Key table. Being able to find out the anonymous certificate used during the mutual authentication process is to support the future ID traceability property.
However, if there is still no match with the two MAC values after R has tried all possible k keys, the message is considered as invalid and will be dropped. After this process, R can continue the message-aggregation process as presented in Section IV-C.
With the adoption of k-anonymity, the verification process remains the same as before. Vehicles compare whether there is a match between the deaggregated H(ID i M i T S i ) from HAggt and the buffered H(ID i M i T S i ) value in any record. Here, the cost of comparison computation can be neglected compared with the message verification of the PKI-based scheme in [4] .
V. COOPERATIVE MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION
In general, RSUs may not cover all the busy streets in a city or a highway, for example, at the beginning of VANETs' deployment period, or due to the physical damage of some RSUs, or simply for economic considerations. How to address the scalability issues under the aforementioned circumstances is the focus of this section. In this section, we introduce a cooperative message authentication scheme named COMET. By making the neighboring vehicles cooperatively work, COMET can ensure that a vehicle knows the authenticity of all received messages without verifying all the message signatures it receives. Notice that COMET is a supplementary approach of RAISE solving the message LR issue. The details of COMET are presented as follows.
A. Probabilistic Verification
First of all, we present the basic idea behind COMET, which is enlightened in [20] and [21] in different application scenarios. Suppose a vehicle sends a message using a PKI-based signature scheme to its n neighbors. To make sure the message is valid, all the neighbors (e.g., n neighbors) should verify the same signature. In other words, n neighbors do the duplicated work. Clearly, much redundant work is done, particularly when n is large. On the contrary, in COMET, we make n neighbors cooperate such that only a small number of them verify the same signature. Once a neighbor who verified the signature discovers an invalid signature, it will one-hop broadcast the result to other neighbors.
The details of COMET are shown in Algorithm 1. In Algorithm 1, V i , V j , and V k are three vehicles that can onehop communicate with each other, where i, j, k = 1, . . . , n, and i = j = k. When V i receives a message M j σ j sent by V j , V i determines whether to verify the signature σ j with probability p (we name p the verification probability). If V i determines the verification of σ j , and σ j is proved to be valid, V i keeps silent and consumes M j . On the other hand, if V i verifies σ j and discovers that σ j is invalid, V i informs the other neighbors that M j σ j is an invalid message by one-hop broadcasting ID M j σ i , where ID M j is used to uniquely identify the message M j σ j , and σ i is the signature signed by V i on ID M j . Otherwise, if V i determines not to verify σ j , V i waits Δt milliseconds for the other neighbors' reports. If V i receives an invalidity report ID M j σ k from V k in Δt, V i knows that M j σ j may be invalid. To ensure M j σ j 's invalidity, V i verifies M j σ j by itself. If V i receives no report from other neighbors within Δt, V i treats M j σ j as a valid message by default. Here, Δt should be greater than the total time to verify two signatures and the transmission delay between two vehicles, which is further discussed in Section VI-B.
B. Reliability Analysis
This section discusses how to guarantee that the validity result of a specific message (M i ) will always be received by all neighboring vehicles. Intuitively, at least one vehicle should work as the candidate to verify the message M i , namely, the probability that there exists at least one vehicle, which will verify M i , is as close to 1 as possible. However, from the communication range's point of view, only one vehicle that verifies a message is not enough. For example, in Fig. 4 , suppose that V 1 and V 3 are V 2 's neighbors. V 2 sends a bogus message, and V 3 determines to verify it, while V 1 does not. Since V 1 is not in the communication range of V 3 , it cannot receive the report from V 3 . Therefore, without loss of generality, there should exist at least two vehicles verifying a message sent by a vehicle, for example, V . One vehicle should physically be in front of V , whereas the other should be behind V . Let n be the total number of neighboring vehicles of V , i be the number of neighbors in front of V , and n − i be the number of neighbors behind V . Notice that the value of n can be known by each vehicle because each vehicle periodically broadcasts its traffic-related information (e.g., a pseudo identity and a position) every 300 ms. Suppose that V 's neighbors are uniformly distributed around V and that each vehicle's position is independent. Let A i be the event that there are i vehicles in front of V and n − i vehicles behind V . Let B be the event that there are at least two vehicles that will verify a message sent by V , one of which is in front of V and where the other is behind V . Then, Pr{B} can be represented as a function of n and p as
where
i is the probability that none of the i vehicles in front of V will verify a message sent by V , 1 − (1 − p) i is the probability that there is at least one vehicle that will verify the message, and 1 − (1 − p) n−i is the probability that there is at least one vehicle behind V that will verify the message, respectively;
n−i because each vehicle's position is independent, and the number of vehicles in front of (or behind) V follows the binomial distribution with parameters n and 1/2. Our objective is to make Pr{B} as close to 1 as possible. Fig. 5 shows the relationship among Pr{B}, p, and n. It can be seen that Pr{B} increases as either p or n increases. The increasing gradient is rather sharp. Pr{B} quickly approaches 1 when p is a small value (e.g., Pr{B} = 99.98% when p = 15% and n = 120). Moreover, we can conclude from Fig. 5 that when Pr{B} is fixed, p is inversely proportional to n. In particular, when n is large, p should be small, and vice versa. Our objective is to change p to make Pr{B} approach 1 as much as possible. On the other hand, under the condition that Pr{B} has sufficiently approached 1, we try to make p as small as possible because a small value of p implies that a vehicle can potentially save processor (e.g., CPU) resources and can further verify more messages when the traffic load becomes larger.
For each vehicle to choose an appropriate p under different values of n, we use the parameter k = n · p to leverage the inversely proportional relationship between p and n. Notice that k presents the average number of signatures that a vehicle verifies every 300 ms because n is the total number of neighbors (each of which sends a message every 300 ms), and p is the verification probability. If we can find a suitable k, then the corresponding p can be determined. Based on (1), we can obtain the relationship between Pr{B} and n in terms of different k, as shown in Fig. 6 . From Fig. 6(a) and (b) , we can see that Pr{B} with k = 10 and Pr{B} with k = 20 are not very close to 1. However, from Fig. 6(d) , we can see that Pr{B} with k = 25 is sufficiently close to 1, no matter how large n is. Therefore, we conclude that in COMET, we can set k as a constant value, i.e., 25. Since k is fixed, p can be computed as k/n (that is, 25/n). In other words, we can change p according to n. For example, a vehicle V having 50 neighbors receives a message M i , and V will verify M i with the probability of 25/50. Notice that V knows the number of its neighbors. In the case where n is less than 25, let p be equal to 100%. It is worth noting that k cannot be larger than the vehicle V 's verification capability, which is the maximum number of verifications that the vehicle V can process.
C. Misbehavior Resilience
Misbehavior or selfish behavior is an inherent attack in cooperative networks. In our scheme, there are two kinds of misbehaviors. 1) Some vehicles do not verify any signature, and instead, they just wait for the other honest nodes' reports. 2) Some vehicles verify signatures, but they do not send any report to other vehicles. 3 Previously related studies have addressed misbehavior issues. Zhang et al. [22] introduce a credit-based scheme that encourages nodes forwarding packets in mobile ad hoc networks. Zhang et al. [10] employ a tamperproof device in vehicular sensor networks, and the tamper-proof device can trustworthily generate pseudorandom identities for a vehicle. Although these schemes can prevent misbehavior, the overhead is high (such as credit management in [22] ). Based on COMET, we can increase the value of k (and the corresponding p) to eliminate the effect caused by misbehaving vehicles. Assume that the total percentage of misbehaving vehicles in VANETs is not more than 50%, which is similar to that in [23] and [24] . This assumption is reasonable because, in reality, misbehaving vehicles are expected to make up only a small portion of the total vehicles. Let c represent the percentage of misbehaving vehicles in vehicular networks. In this case, if a vehicle has n neighbors, there would exist (1 − c) · n vehicles that apply COMET and c · n misbehaving vehicles. As such, based on (1), Pr{B} equals 1 Fig. 7(a) shows that Pr{B} decreases as c increases. The ideal result is to keep Pr{B} as the case where k = 25 and c = 0.0 [as shown Fig. 6(d) ]. Our solution is to increase the parameter k, i.e., let k = 50. Fig. 7(b) indicates that Pr{B} with k = 50 and c = 0.5 approximates Pr{B} with k = 25 and c = 0.0. Therefore, COMET with k = 50 can effectively eliminate the negative effects of misbehaving vehicles. In the next section, through simulation, we will see that k = 50 is feasible for a PKI-based (e.g., ECDSA [15] ) signature scheme, which will not introduce a high message LR.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we use the ns-2 simulator [25] to evaluate the performance of RAISE and COMET in terms of the message loss radio, the message end-to-end delay, and the communication overhead, respectively, compared with the group-signaturebased scheme in [5] and the standard PKI-based ECDSA signature scheme in [15] . In the simulation, COMET is simulated based on the ECDSA signature scheme. We simulate a traffic scenario with high vehicle density. An RSU is located at an intersection, and 30-200 vehicles can associate with the RSU. Notice that an RSU is only used in RAISE, and other schemes do not need an RSU's help. The intervehicular distance varies from 7.5 to 15 m to simulate scenarios with different traffic densities. The distance limits for IVC and RVC are 300 and 600 m, respectively. Intervehicle messages are sent every 300 ms at each vehicle. IEEE 802.11a is used to simulate the transmission protocol in the medium access control layer. The bandwidth of the channel is 6 Mb/s. The group signature verification delay is 11 ms [26] . The ECDSA signature verification delay is 3.87 ms. 4 All possible cryptographic operations in the simulation are considered to have the same simulation delay.
A. Message LR
The average message LR is defined as
where N represents the total number of vehicles in the simulation. For the group-signature-based and PKI-based signature schemes, M For COMET, the group signature, and PKI-based ECDSA signature schemes, we only consider the message loss incurred by delays due to the security scheme rather than the wireless transmission channel. Since RAISE needs two-hop communications, we consider the loss caused by wireless communications between the RSU and vehicles. Fig. 8 shows the relationship between the message LR and the traffic load. The traffic load is represented by the number of vehicles. For RAISE, the RSU periodically broadcasts an aggregation of H(ID i M i T S i ) every 10 ms. From Fig. 8 , we can see that the message LR of RAISE, the group signature, and the PKI-based ECDSA signature schemes increase as the traffic load increases. The group-signature-based scheme has the highest LR, and the PKI-based scheme ranks the second. RAISE, on the other hand, has the lowest LR. From the simulation, most of the message losses of RAISE come from the two-hop wireless transmission. In addition, Fig. 8 shows that COMET with k = 50 also has a quite low message LR, and the LR does not change with the number of vehicles. Since k is a constant, i.e., 50 in our simulation, each vehicle verifies a constant number of message signatures no matter how many neighbors a vehicle has. In other words, the number of message signatures that a vehicle may verify is independent of the traffic density, and the message LR is thus independent of the traffic density.
B. Message Authentication Delay (MAD)
The average MAD is defined in (3) represents the moment that the ith vehicle in the application layer sends the mth message to the kth vehicle, i.e., Fig. 9 shows the relationship between the MAD and the traffic load. Again, the group signature scheme has the highest MAD. This is due to the high delay verifying a message signature. The PKI-based ECDSA scheme and RAISE yield nearly the same MAD. Since the comparison computation is very fast, the delay of RAISE is primarily determined by the packet release interval at the RSU. For example, the packet release interval Δt is 10 ms in our simulation, which serves as the main contribution of the MAD. To reduce the MAD, we can decrease this time interval at the expense of increasing the communication overhead, which will further be discussed in the next section. For COMET, as mentioned in Section V-A, the MAD can adjustably be set, but it must be larger than the total time to verify two signatures and the transmission delay between two vehicles. In Fig. 9 , we can see that when there are 50 vehicles, the MAD for the PKI-based ECDSA signature scheme is 12 ms. Verifying a single signature with ECDSA needs 3.87 ms. Thus, the MAD of COMET should be larger than 12 + 3.87 ms plus the transmission delay. Since the transmission delay is negligible, the 20-ms delay, which is far larger than 12 + 3.87 ms, is feasible. The reason that we add 3.87 ms is because a vehicle should verify a bogus message signature in person when it receives a report from other vehicles.
C. Communication Overhead
The communication overheads of ECDSA [15] , the groupsignature-based scheme [5] , COMET based on ECDSA, and RAISE, respectively, are listed below. With ECDSA, each message yields 181 B as the additional overhead due to cryptographic operations, which includes a certificate and an ECDSA signature, as shown in Fig. 2 . With the group-signature-based scheme, the additional communication overhead is 184 B [26] . With COMET, the communication overhead is the same as the ECDSA when there is no bogus signature. Due to the fact that vehicles sending bogus signatures are rather rare, the additional reports of the bogus signatures are negligible. Therefore, the communication overhead caused by COMET is equal to that of ECDSA. With RAISE, the additional communication overhead is 128 bits + 128 bits + (56 + 2)/n bytes, where the first 128 represents the length of a MAC sent by a vehicle, the second 128 bits represent the length of the H(ID i M i T S i ) packet that is sent by an RSU, 56 B is the length of an ECDSA signature [15] signed by the RSU, and 2 B is the length of a message header, as shown in Fig. 2 . Here, 56 + 2 B are shared by n messages, because in RAISE, n messages are batched and signed once. Note that n is determined by the density of vehicles and the packet release interval for the RSU to broadcast a batched packet. Fig. 10 shows the relationship between the overall communication overhead in 1 min and the traffic load within an RSU. We can see that RAISE with the time interval of 10 ms has a much lower communication overhead than that of the PKIbased ECDSA signature scheme and the group-signature-based scheme. Furthermore, the communication overhead of RAISE is 24.94% of the PKI-based ECDSA signature scheme and 23.64% of the group-signature-based scheme. To further illustrate the effect of the time interval on RAISE, Fig. 11 shows the relationship between the time interval and the overall communication overhead caused by 100, 150, 200, and 250 vehicles, respectively, in 1 min. Clearly, as the time interval increases, particularly from 2 to 10 ms, the communication overhead sharply decreases. However, when the time interval is up to 10 ms or larger, it has very little effect on the communication overhead. This is because the frequency of sending 56 + 2 B decreases as the time interval increases. From Fig. 11 , we can also see that the communication overhead increases by approximately 0.3 MB every time the number of vehicles increases by 50.
VII. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the security of the proposed schemes in terms of message integrity and source authentication, prevention of internal attack, replay attack resistance, and conditional privacy preservation.
Message Integrity and Source Authentication: With RAISE, a vehicle generates a MAC for each launched message. The MAC can only be generated by the vehicle that has the key assigned by the RSU. If an adversary tampers with a message, the RSU cannot find a responding validation key that can compute a matching MAC for the message, and therefore, the intercepted message will be ignored. In addition, for each vehicle, there is a unique key stored in the ID-Key table at the RSU side. If an RSU can find out a key to verify a MAC, the RSU can know the identity of the message sender, and therefore, the source is authenticated. On the other hand, with COMET, we can also achieve message integrity and source authentication because COMET works exactly the same way as the other PKI-based schemes such as ECDSA. Due to the nature of message integrity and source authentication, typical attacks, such as bogus attack and impersonation attack [4] , can be prevented.
Prevention of Internal Attack: RAISE is robust against not only external attacks but internal attacks as well. Even if a vehicle is compromised, and its symmetric secret session key shared with an RSU is exposed to an adversary, the adversary cannot trace the other vehicle's movement because it cannot distinguish the vehicles that use the same pseudo ID with the compromised vehicle. Therefore, RAISE can resist a keycompromise impersonation attack.
Replay Attack Resistance: With a replay attack, an adversary replays intercepted messages to impersonate a legitimate vehicle. Obviously, this impersonation cannot work with RAISE because a time stamp T S i is attached with the corresponding M i , and all vehicles keep time synchronization. Suppose an adversary intercepts a message ID i M i T S i MAC K i (ID i M i T S i ) and launches a replay attack at time T S j . Because the time period |T S j − T S i | > ΔT , where ΔT is a mutually agreed to transmission delay, the receiver will reject the message. Therefore, RAISE is robust to resisting the replay attack.
Conditional Privacy Preservation: RAISE makes vehicles use pseudo identities to protect their real identities. Nevertheless, RSUs are able to know the anonymous certificate corresponding to a pseudo identity, and a TA is capable of tracing the real identity of a vehicle from its anonymous certificate. For example, a vehicle V i sends a bogus message, which contains the pseudo identity ID i that an RSU allocates. Once the RSU finds out that the content of the message is bogus, the RSU can know the anonymous certificate of the V i from the trace evidence table in which the ID i uniquely maps the anonymous certificate C V i , as shown in Fig. 3(b) . Further, the RSU gives the certificate C V i to a TA, which has the ability to trace the real identity of the V i from C V i . Therefore, in RAISE, vehicles cannot tell their real identities to each other, whereas RSUs can distinguish whether two messages are sent by the same vehicle. The TA and RSUs cooperate, which can trace the real identity of a message sender.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, a novel RSU-aided message authentication scheme named RAISE has been proposed. With RAISE, RSUs are responsible for verifying the authenticity of messages sent by vehicles and notifying the authentication results back to all the associated vehicles. The RAISE scheme has many advantages because of its lower computation and communication overhead. RAISE also protects the vehicles' privacy by adopting the k-anonymity approach. In addition, a cooperative message authentication scheme named COMET has been proposed to work as a supplementary scheme of RAISE in case of the absence of an RSU. COMET not only efficiently reduces the message LR but is also resilient against the misbehavior of vehicles. In our future work, we will explore an efficient revocation scheme to revoke misbehaving or faulty vehicles. In addition, fast disseminating revocation information will also be investigated.
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